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1.1 Systems, models and simulation 
Since the 1950s, engineers have paid much attention to the study of complex, 
dynamic systems. Their successes inspired biologists to apply similar techniques in 
their disciplines. The approach is characterized by the terms: system, model and 
simulation. 
A system is a limited part of reality that contains interrelated elements. The 
totality of relations within the system is known as the 'system structure': both 
systems and models have a structure. A model is a simplified representation of a 
system. Simulation is the building of mathematical models and the study of their 
behaviour in reference to those of the systems. 
There are many kinds of models. A simple mathematical model is the well-known 
relation between velocity and distance covered by a falling apple depending on the 
gravitational acceleration and the time from the moment of release. An example of a 
non-mathematical model is a map. This is a simplified representation of the earth's 
surface containing relevant information and it allows measurements of distances or 
areas. Depending on the objectives, a map will display railway lines, lines of equal 
rainfall or vegetation. A scale model of a ship in a towing tank enables measure-
ments of its resistence in the water to help predict the behaviour of the real ship 
when this has been built. 
It follows from the definition that a model is a system, but the reverse may also be 
true. A machine is a model of the conception of the engineer and it certainly performs 
worse than expected. And when an engineer applies simulation, he develops models 
that lie in between his conception and reality. The ultimate machine is in fact a 
model of his simulation model, which in its turn is a simplified representation of his 
mental conception. 
Biological systems are not simplified representations of the conception of the bio-
logist, even though current trends in agriculture might seem to be moving that way. 
Therefore, it may be that the approach that has been so successful in technology is 
not as useful in biology. There are, of course, ample examples of biological systems: 
a membrane, a cell, an organ, a plant, an animal, a field, a woodland and a lake. In 
this context, fields, woods, lakes, estuaries, pastures and all the rest have been given 
the general name of 'ecosystems'. 
A system is a limited part of reality, so that a border has to be chosen. It is wise to 
select the boundary so that the system is isolated from its environment. This is 
hardly ever possible, but then it should be attempted to choose a border so that the 
environment might influence the system, but that the system affects the environment 
as little as possible. To this end, it is often essential to Select a system that is larger 
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than would seem necessary for the primary objective. Therefore, in ecological sys-
tems, the microclimate is often a part of the system, but most people willingly ne-
glect -unjustly- the influence of the processes in the ecosystem on the macroclimate, 
that is considered to be a measurable environment not influenced by the ecosystem. 
1.2 Descriptive and explanatory models 
A file with data on an ecosystem might be called a model, but it is one of the most 
unclear and unusable kinds. Potential uses of the data may be formulated however, 
and then clarity may be introduced by a treatment of this data. This may result in 
maps that represent aspects of the ecosystem, or in statistical analysis which summa-
rize some of the interrelations. If the time dimension is also taken into account 
during collection and treatment of the data, these models are no longer static but 
dynamje. However, those moâBÏ'STemsàTttlesvripttVeTsRowing the existence of rela-
tions between the elements of a system without any explanation, but. of course, this 
was not their original pujrpc 
However, explanatory models are possible in biology, because various levels of 
organization or knowledge are distinguished in this science, just like in all other 
natural sciences. These levels of knowledge distinguish themselves by the level of 
integration at which the processes occur. The different levels of integration may be 
classified, according to the size of the system, such as molecules, cell structures, 
cells, tissues, organs, individuals, populations, communities and ecosystems. 
ri Explanatory models demand that research has to be carried out for at least two inte-
^ grationTevgls/The lower integration level will then be the explanatory level and the 
upper level is the one to be explained. In this way, one might attempt to derive the 
characteristics of membranes from the characteristics of the molecules of which they 
consist, or one might try to explain the processes in an ecosystem on the basis of 
knowledge of the behaviour and physiology of the constituent species. When 
knowledge at the explanatory level is sufficiently extensive and authoritative, and a 
model of the system to be explained is designed on this basis, it will not be necessa-
ry to test the model by comparing its results with those of the real system. For 
example, models for space travel are so good that the actual journey into space is 
unnecessary. But explanatory models in biology are frequently so inadequate that 
proof of their usefulness is necessary. Even if the results of the model correspond to 
the observations of the system being modelled, there is room for doubt regarding the 
correctness of the model. However, good agreement is still more the exception than 
the rule. 
If there are discrepancies between the results of the model and reality, the model 
may be adjusted to obtain better agreement. Then, something that started as an 
explanatory model will degenerate into a descriptive model. The term 'degeneration' in 
this context does not mean that descriptive models are inferior to explanatory models. 
It is used here to emphasize that in this way inscrutable models are obtained with an 
unjustified pretention to explain something. This is the reason why many models 
made in ecological studies to date havejjpne more harm than good. 
The proper way of working is[heuristic^ by the path of methodical improvement. 
When unacceptable discrepancies between the model and the system are observed, it 
may be possible to determine by experiments with both the model and the system, 
which aspects of the model are suspicious. These aspects are then studied at the ex-
planatory level. On basis of this new information, elements of the model may be 
replaced by improved versions, after which the results of the model and the reality 
may be compared once more. 
Explanatory models can be static or dvnamic. An example of a static model is one 
in which the connection between respiration and growth of organisms is calculated on 
the basis of knowledge of the biochemical processes involved. Another example is a 
model in which the light distribution over the leaves of a vegetation is calculated 
from the canopy architecture, reflection and transmission of the leaves, solar 
position, and the brightness of the sky. The results of the calculations performed 
with these static models or the models themselves, often form a part of dynamic mo-
dels. These dynamic models are simplified versions of dynamic systems, or in other 
words, systems that change with time. The development of these models and the 
study of their behaviour is frequently called 'simulation'. 
1.3 State-determined dynamic systems and models 
Simulation of ecological systems with an explanatory model is based on the 
asssumption that the state of every system at every moment can be quantitatively 
characterized and that changes in a system can be described by means of mathematical 
equations. This hypothesis leads to the formulation of state-determined dynamic 
models, in which state-, rate- and driving variables can be distinguished. 
State variables are variables like the amounts of biomass, the number of animals, 
the amount of nitrogen or water in soil, plant or animal, etcetera. 
Driving variables or forcing functions characterize the influence of external factors 
on the system, and are not influenced by the processes within the system. Their value 
must be monitored continuously. Examples are macro-meteorological variables such 
as rain, wind and radiation, or the supply of nutrients or migration of animals over 
the boundaries of the system. Depending on the system's limits, the same variables 
can be driving variables, or state or rate variables. 
Rate variables indicate the rate at which the state variables change. Their values are 
determined by the state and driving variables according to rules that are based on 
knowledge of the physical, chemical and biological processes that take place in the 
system, and not on the basis of a statistical analysis of the behaviour of the system. 
This is the most important distinction between models that describe and models that 
attempt to explain. 
After the calculation of all rate variables, these are used to calculate the state 
variables according to the scheme: state variable at time t+At is equal to the state 
variable at time t plus the rate at time t multiplied by At. This procedure, called 
integration, gives the new values of the state variables, and the calculational 
procedure may be repeated. Obviously, modern calculators are indispensable here. 
Later in this book, various examples will be presented of applications in ecology. 
Rates are not interdependent in state-determined systems: each rate depends at each 
moment on the value of state and driving variables and can therefore be calculated 
independent of any other rate. We can illustrate this mutual independence of rates by 
means of the following example. It will be clear that the rate of plant growth, as 
measured by the increase in weight of its structural tissues, is closely related tó the 
net photosynthesis in the leaves. However, in an explanatory model of plant growth, 
this relation is the result of the simultaneous operation of various processes, and it is 
thus no direct relation. The rate of photosynthesis contributes to the amount of the 
plant's reserves and, also dependent upon other state variables, the growth rate of the 
various organs is connected with the amount of reserves. Although photosynthesis 
stops when it gets dark, growth does continue until the reserves have been exhausted, 
and sometimes even further, but then at the cost of previously formed structural 
tissues. 
The number of state variables that can be distinguished in ecosystems is discoura-
gmgly large. This does not only involve plants, herbivores, carnivores and micro-
organisms, but also their various kinds, and of these the numbers, the size, the age, 
the development stage, etc. For plants, not only the weight and the surface area of the 
leaves are of importance, but also their nitrogen and mineral contents, their enzymes 
and other biochemical characteristics. It is possible to continue in this way, and this 
is the very reason why attempts at constructing models on the basis of a full 
knowledge of all the biological, physical and chemical processes are completely 
unrealistic. Models are nothing more than simplified representations of reality, and 
this simplification characterizes itself by the limited number of state variables that 
are taken into account. 
Analogous to other scientific approaches, it is assumed that the number of state 
variables in a model is not only limited by the boundaries of the system to be 
studied, but also by a clear description of the objectives. Consequently, it can never 
be a reasonable objective of a model to fully comprehend an ecosystem, but if this is 
so, what might it then be? For every application of models or their construction, we 
must start by clearly describing the objective. 
In agriculture the formulation of this objective is, initially, simple: to obtain 
insight into the relation between yield on the one hand and human effort on the other. 
This objective can be further detailed into questions regarding the relation between the 
addition of nitrogen and yield for well-defined boundary conditions. For every 
objective an optimum can be found for the number of state variables that should be 
included. Initially, the applicability of a model increases with an increasing number 
of state variables. But then the applicability decreases again because the inclusion of 
a new state variable diverts the attention from the state variables introduced 
previously because these were considered more important. The attempt at arranging 
the s ate variables in order of importance is very time-consuming, and many 
modelling efforts in ecology are sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly, 
geared towards this goal. 
1.4 The usefulness of ecological research using models 
The maintenance of the integrity and of options for developments of ecosystems, 
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such as fields, woods, estuaries and the human society as a whole, is one of the 
greatest problems of society. The question is whether it is also a scientific problem. 
This will only be the case when the problem has not been solved and when it can be 
made acceptable on theoretical grounds that the problem can be solved. We need not 
worry about the former, and as far as solvability is concerned: precisely the existence 
of techniques that enable us to summarize knowledge in operative simulation models 
will inspire some people to an optimistic vision. But is this justified? Problems can 
only be solved when the solution can be falsified or, being rather more positive with 
regard to modelling, when models can be tested for their usefulness. To investigate 
the possibilities for this, it is useful to distinguish between verifiable and speculative 
models. 
Verifiable models can only be created from repeatable or recurring systems. 
Examples of repeatable systems are continuous cultures of bacteria, farms and 
industrial processes. Recurring systems appear to the observer at different places at 
the same time in different stages. Examples are: stars, individuals of a species and 
ecological systems whose development in time is controlled by strong negative 
feedbacks, such as peat bogs. Of these latter ecosystems no two will ever be the 
same, but this does not imply that their models might not be identical: after all, a 
model remains a simplified representation of reality. It is clear that experiments can 
always be carried out with repeatable systems, but that recurring systems are not or 
less accessible to experimentation. Ecology develops from a descriptive science to a 
science in which experiments are carried out with repeatable and recurring systems. 
The latter is justified because the chance of disturbances is small due to the existence 
of negative feedbacks in these systems, and because there are many of them. System-
analytic research and simulation should be limited to repeatable and recurring systems 
to even a greater extent than the experiments, because the knowledge of the processes 
that occur is still so limited that verification of models is needed. 
Besides repeatable and recurring systems, unique systems exist. Examples of these 
are climatic systems and systems determined by geographical circumstances such as 
the Oosterschelde (Eastern estuary of the river Schelde), the Waddenzee (Wadden Sea 
to the north of the Netherlands), the world itself and human society, as well as eco-
systems whose development is only controlled by weak negative feedbacks within 
narrow limits, so that the originally identical systems may diverge in space and time. 
Evolution itself is an example of such a system and consequently also breeding in 
agriculture. Precisely because the breeding process is irreversible, it is only justified 
when measures are taken to conserve the gene pool. Models of unique systems are 
speculative models, since they cannot be tested for their usefulness. After all, analy-
sis and testing should apply to completely independent systems if the results of the 
test are to lead to the possibility of rejecting the model. Of course, unique systems 
possess recurring elements and these can be isolated and thus made accessible for 
experiments and the construction of models. Therefore, unique systems can be parti-
ally analysed and sometimes experiments can be performed within these systems. The 
significance of observation and experimentation should then be weighed against the 
risk of disturbing the system; in case of doubt no experiments should be done. 
Therefore, genetic manipulation should be carried out with the greatest care. 
Speculative models cannot be verified but they can more or less be trusted. The 
confidence in these models will grow when analogous methods of analysing repea-
table and recurring systems lead to the formulation of verifiable models with useful 
results. The confidence in models of unique systems whose behaviour is controlled 
by physical phenomena might even be quite large. Nobody need seriously doubt the 
calculations regarding the relation between the height of the dikes and the chance of 
flooding in the Netherlands, but when flooding occurs, confidence will have decreased 
dramatically. 
In ecology, useful models have only been constructed of relatively simple systems, 
and according to some, only of those systems that also could have been understood 
without the use of the advanced methods of systems analysis and simulation. 
Therefore, confidence in speculative models of unique systems is justifiable small. 
The tragic is that, scientifically speaking, ecologists are only able to make state-
ments on a growing number of repeatable and recurring systems, but that society is 
demanding statements on the development of the unique systems. Meeting society's 
requirements can therefore easily lead to plainly fraudulent comments. Many 
ecologists are well aware of this and refrain from making statements, but this then 
results in this blank patch in our knowledge being filled in irresponsibly by so-called 
instant-ecologists. 
'Global models' with any perspective of being useful are more complicated than 
models of those ecosystems whose usefulness has been demonstrated. Indeed, these 
models should include knowledge from many different scientific disciplines, and in 
some of the relevant scientific disciplines, this knowledge is significantly smaller 
than for those of the physical, chemical and biological processes that will play a role 
in simple ecosystems. This will mean that the basis for confidence will be missing 
and in many cases will not even be laid. Consequently, 'global' models remain unu-
sable instruments in the preparation of policy decisions. Therefore, the question is 
whether research efforts should be made to analyse 'global' systems that may result in 
speculative, interdisciplinary models. Nevertheless, the answer is in the affirmative. 
The basis for eventual confidence can be laid by comparative research of verifiable and 
speculative models. Systems analysis and modelling are the only developing interdis-
ciplinary professional fields that enable us to integrate and oversee our incomplete 
knowledge, and it is pointless to throw away half-worn-out shoes before new ones 
have been designed. And long before speculative, interdisciplinary models can be used 
to support governmental decisions in society, these kinds of models can be used as 
instruments of research policy in order to indicate research priorities. 
Criteria can be formulated to which speculative, interdisciplinary models and 
considerations must comply in order to contribute to scientific development. This can 
result in recommendations for research that become increasingly important when 
more models are evaluated in a comparable manner. Possible criteria are: 
- The objectives of the model must be well-described. 
- Based on the objectives it should be argued which disciplines are to contribute to 
the development of the model, and to what extent. 
- The contributions from the various disciplines should be reasonably scientifically 
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reliable. 
Verifiable parts of the model should indeed be tested. 
Claims to usefulness should be critically evaluated. 
The model must be sound; this means that it should be known which suppositions 
have been incorporated, and this should be done in such manner that the 
consequences of other suppositions can be determined within the framework of the 
model's objectives. 
The model must be used soundly. This means that the designers will have investi-
gated and commented on the consequences of a reasonable number of suppositions, 
and not only those suppositions which might confirm presuppositions on the 
results. 
The model must be clear and others than the designers should be able to use it. 
